Southeast Asia Indonesia

How Indonesia Unraveled in Saudi Arabia Defeat

Indonesia’s dream of reaching the 2026 FIFA World Cup took a heavy hit on the night of October 9th, when the Timnas Garuda fell 3–2 to Saudi Arabia at the King Abdullah Sports City Stadium in Jeddah. It was a result that not only dented their qualifying campaign but also raised serious questions about the direction of the team under head coach Patrick Kluivert.

The Dutchman’s men arrived as clear underdogs, yet for a brief moment, it seemed as if a shock might be on the cards. In the 11th minute, Kevin Diks confidently converted a penalty, stunning the Saudi crowd into silence. For Indonesia, it was the perfect start. For Saudi Arabia, a wake-up call. What followed, however, was a harsh reminder of how thin the margins are at the highest level of Asian football.

Hervé Renard’s Green Falcons responded with the authority of seasoned World Cup regulars. They equalized through Waheb Ali in the 17th minute before Feras Albrikan’s penalty in the 36th minute turned the game on its head, the Al-Ahli player later scoring again in the 72nd minute to seal the hosts’ advantage. Despite playing the final stages with ten men after Mohamed Kanno’s dismissal, Saudi Arabia managed to see out the win, with Diks’ late second penalty offering only a sliver of consolation.

On paper, a narrow defeat against one of Asia’s elite might look respectable. In reality, Indonesia had collapsed under pressure. Once Diks gave them the lead, the Garuda began to unravel — misplacing passes, losing defensive shape, and committing basic errors that the Saudis ruthlessly punished. By full time, frustration had boiled over among fans, many of whom took to social media to call for the resignation of both Kluivert and Football Association of Indonesia (PSSI) president Erick Thohir. In their eyes, the progress built under former coach Shin Tae-yong was being dismantled piece by piece.


A Tactical Shift That Went Wrong

Since taking charge, Kluivert has been determined to stamp his own identity on Indonesia’s game. That meant moving away from Shin’s familiar three-man defense and adopting a four-man backline — a change that, so far, has done little to convince.

Indonesia had trialed the system during September’s friendlies, a crushing win over a Chinese Taipei whose quality are below them and playing out a drab goalless draw with Lebanon. The results looked acceptable on paper, but the performances, particularly in the Lebanon match, told another story: disjointed, tentative, and lacking defensive chemistry.

The shift meant Kluivert had to break up the tried-and-tested trio of Rizky Ridho, Jordi Amat, and Jay Idzes. With the new formation requiring full-backs, only two of the three could play together, unsettling a defensive core that had once looked solid. Diks’ inclusion — justified by his European experience with FC Copenhagen and Borussia Mönchengladbach — created another dilemma.

While Dean James impressed on the left, effectively displacing natural full-backs like Shayne Pattynama, Asnawi Mangkualam, and Pratama Arhan, the right side remained a glaring weak point. Sandy Walsh’s injury in club competition deprived Indonesia of its most reliable option there, forcing Kluivert to field winger Yakob Sayuri as a makeshift right-back.

The experiment backfired spectacularly. With players still learning the new system, the backline often looked uncertain and stretched, allowing the Saudis to exploit gaps at will. For all of Maarten Paes’ efforts in goal, he could do little to save a defense that was learning on the job.


Midfield Missteps

Further up the pitch, the problems multiplied. The inclusion of Marc Klok divided opinion long before kickoff, and his showing in Jeddah did little to win doubters over.

While the Persib Bandung captain remains a respected leader at club level, his influence rarely translates to the international stage. Partnered with Joey Pelupessy, he struggled to assert control, with Indonesia’s midfield often bypassed by the quicker, more coordinated Saudi engine.

The decision to dismantle the previously effective Pelupessy–Thom Haye pairing backfired badly. With Klok off the pace and Haye sidelined, Indonesia’s midfield lost its rhythm and resilience, leaving the defense exposed and the attack starved of service. For fans who had long championed Klok’s inclusion, the performance was a sobering reality check.


Square Pegs in Round Holes

Kluivert’s tinkering didn’t stop at the back or in midfield. Several players were deployed out of position, a gamble that ultimately blunted Indonesia’s attacking threat.

Yakob Sayuri, more at home terrorizing defenders on the wing, was confined to defensive duties he was ill-suited for. His forward instincts saw him stray too far upfield, leaving spaces the Saudis exploited mercilessly. Meanwhile, defensive midfielder Ricky Kambuaya was surprisingly fielded as a striker. The result was predictable — a lack of connection with Ragnar Oratmangoen, who found himself isolated against a disciplined Saudi backline.

Yakob’s struggles in defense told their own story. He was caught flat-footed along with Klok in the buildup to Waheb Ali’s equalizer, conceded the penalty that handed Albrikan the lead, and reacted too slowly to prevent Saudi’s third. Each mistake compounded Indonesia’s misery and highlighted how tactical experiments, however well-intentioned, can unravel under pressure.


A Team Searching for Identity

Beyond formations and personnel, Indonesia’s performance in Jeddah spoke to a deeper issue — an identity crisis. Under Shin Tae-yong, the Garuda played with purpose: compact in defense, disciplined in pressing, and dangerous on the counter. Under Kluivert, that clarity seems to have faded.

The players now appear caught between two philosophies — uncertain whether to sit deep or play expansively. The result is a team that looks neither organized nor inspired. While the intent to modernize Indonesia’s style is understandable, the timing and execution have left much to be desired.


Where Do They Go From Here?

The 3–2 defeat was more than a single setback; it was a reflection of Indonesia’s growing pains in transition. The Garuda are a team with undeniable potential — one that has shown flashes of quality but lacks the tactical stability to sustain it.

If Kluivert hopes to salvage Indonesia’s World Cup hopes, he must rediscover the structural discipline and collective spirit that defined Shin Tae-yong’s tenure. That means selecting players in their natural roles, solidifying the defense, and rebuilding trust within the squad.

Because in the unforgiving world of World Cup qualifying, lessons unlearned are often punished the hardest — and for Indonesia, there may not be many more chances left to get it right.